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PAGE 01 STATE 065498

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TAGS: PFOR, KS, UN

SUBJECT: US POLICY ON KOREA AT THE UN AND THE UN COMMAND

(S/S NO.7505727) ACTION MEMORANDUM

THE KOREAN QUESTION HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANNUAL UNGA DEBATE FOR 27 YEARS. WITH THE CHANGING PATTERN OF GREAT POWER RELATIONSHIPS, THE EROSION OF OUR VOTING STRENGTH IN THE UNGA AND THE PASSAGE OF TIME, THE ANNUAL KOREAN DEBATE HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO A STERILE EXERCISE DEMANDING VIGOROUS DIPLOMATIC EXERTIONS MERELY TO AVOID DEFEAT IN THE UNGA. THE FOCUS OF THE DEBATE HAS NOW NARROWED TO THE LAST VISIBLE REMNANT OF THE SPECIAL UN ROLE IN KOREA, THE UN COMMAND, AS WELL AS OUR TROOP PRESENCE. (THE NSC STAFF DISAGREES WITH THE JUDGMENT THAT OUR EXERTIONS IN THE ANNUAL UNGA DEBATE OF THE KOREAN QUESTION ARE OF NO VALUE TO US. EVEN THOUGH THE DEBATES HAVE NOT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 065498

RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF THE UN ROLE IN KOREA, THEY STILL

HAVE DEMONSTRATED (A) OUR DETERMINATION TO DISPOSE OF THIS ISSUE IN A NON-DESTABILIZING WAY, AND (B) OUR CONTINUED SOLID SUPPORT FOR THE ROK SECURITY AND DIPLOMATIC POSITION.)

DESPITE THE LARGELY TACIT US-SOVIET-PRC AGREEMENT THAT WAR IN KOREA WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS, THE SITUATION OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE ROK AND DPRK STILL EXISTS. LARGE ARMED FORCES FACE EACH OTHER ACROSS THE DMZ IN A STATE OF CONSIDERABLE TENSION. PYONGYANG IS CONSTRAINED BY A COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES FROM CONTINUING THE LOW LEVEL BUT ADVENTURESOME USE OF MILITARY FORCE IT USED IN THE LATE 1960S. THE NORTH IS INHIBITED BY THE PRC AND SOVIET DETENTE STRATEGY, BY ITS OWN EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH ITSELF INTERNATIONALLY (INCLUDING FEELERS FOR DIRECT CONTACTS WITH US), AND BY A REALIZATION THAT THE HIGH LEVEL OF MILITARY TENSION WHICH EXISTED IN THE POST-PUEBLO PERIOD LED TO A SIGNIFICANT STRENGTHENING OF THE ROK MILITARILY AND PROBABLY INTERNALLY. AT THE SAME TIME PYONGYANG USES PEKING AND MOSCOW'S RIVALRY FOR INFLUENCE WITH IT TO CONSTRAIN EITHER OF ITS ALLIES FROM PRESSING UNWANTED ASPECTS OF DETENTE.

FOR ITS PART THE ROKG IS SEEKING TO CONTAIN THE NORTH'S DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE, TO ACCELERATE MODERNIZATION OF ITS ARMED FORCES (INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR OPTION), AND TO MOVE TOWARDS DEFENSE SELF-SUFFICIENCY NOW THAT IT IS LESS CERTAIN OF U.S. DEPENDABILITY.

IN THIS SITUATION OUR BASIC INTEREST IS IN MAINTAINING STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THAT IN TURN DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON (A) THE DETERRENT PROVIDED BY SOUTH KOREA AND U.S. FORCES AND (B) THE PRESERVATION OF THE ARMISTICE. PERPETUATION OF THE UNC PER SE IS NOT OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. IT IS IMPORTANT IN MAINTAINING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. AT LAST YEAR'S UNGA WE PUT OURSELVES ON RECORD AS OFFERING UNC TERMINATION IN EXCHANGE FOR ASSURANCES REGARDING THE CONTIN-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 065498

UATION OF THE ARMISTICE.

I. THE PROBLEM.

ALTHOUGH WE ACHIEVED A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME IN THE LAST UNGA DEBATE ON THE KOREA ITEM, BOTH WE AND THE ROKG ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT WE GAIN NOTHING FROM THE ANNUAL UN DEBATE AND THAT THERE ARE INCREAS-

ING RISKS THAT A UNGA MAJORITY MAY VOTE FOR DIS-
SOLUTION OF THE UNC AND PERHAPS THE WITHDRAWAL OF
US FORCES. ALTHOUGH SUCH UNGA ACTIONS WOULD HAVE NO
LEGAL EFFECT, THEY WOULD CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT
DIPLOMATIC DEFEAT, PARTICULARLY FOR THE ROK.

OUR LONG-TERM PROBLEM ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA --
MAINTAINING THE PEACE AND INDUCING NORTH KOREA TO
RELINQUISH ITS LONG TERM OBJECTIVE OF REUNIFYING THE
PENINSULA BY FORCE. IN THE BROADER CONTEXT, THIS
LONG-TERM PROBLEM ALSO INVOLVES OTHER ISSUES: (A)
HOW TO INDUCE THE PRC AND THE SOVIETS TO INFLUENCE
NORTH KOREA TOWARD THIS END, (B) THE NATURE OF OUR
FUTURE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH KOREA, IN-
CLUDING DECISIONS ON FORCE LEVELS AND MILITARY ASSIS-
TANCE, AND (C) HOW AND WHEN WE -- AND JAPAN -- SHOULD
EXPAND CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA.

THE PROBLEM FOR THE NEAR TERM IS: WILL THE PRC
BE WILLING AND ABLE TO PERSUADE NORTH KOREA TO NEGOTIATE
A TERMINATION OF THE UNC ON MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS?
IF THE ANSWER IS NO, THE POLICY ISSUE IS: SHOULD WE
HANG ONTO THE UNC UNTIL WE CAN GET ADEQUATE ASSURANCES
FROM THE PRC AND DPRK THAT THE ARMISTICE WILL BE MAIN-
TAINED AS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT FOLLOWING DISSOLUTION
OF THE UNC.

II. BACKGROUND

-- PAST DISCUSSION OF UNC TERMINATION WITH THE PRC.

EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CON-
SENSUS ARRANGEMENT WITH THE CHINESE AND NORTH KOREANS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 065498

ON THE UNC ISSUE FAILED LAST FALL. OUR OFFER TO THE
PRC AND NK OF TERMS FOR TERMINATING THE UNC (CONVEYED
TO THE PRC LAST JUNE) HAVE NOT LED TO ANY MEANINGFUL
DISCUSSION. OUR TERMS WERE: MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT, US-PRC INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT,
AND TACIT ACQUIESCENCE IN A US TROOP PRESENCE IN EXCHANGE
FOR SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE. WHILE THE OTHER SIDE
DID NOT EXPLICITLY REJECT THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR PACKAGE
PROPOSAL, THEY MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT
FOR MOVEMENT AND THAT THERE WOULD BE A CONFRONTATION
IN THE UNGA.

-- LAST FALL'S UNGA DEBATE.

IN THE ENSUING UNGA DEBATE WE DECLARED OUR WILL-

INGNESS TO TERMINATE THE UNC IF CONTINUATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS ENSURED. OUR POSITION WAS EMBODIED IN THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY A SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN IN THE UNGA. AT THE SAME TIME THE OTHER SIDE'S RESOLUTION -- CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN

TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE UN FLAG -- WAS BARELY DEFEATED BY A TIE VOTE IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE. AT THIS POINT WE BELIEVE ANOTHER UNGA DEBATE IS ALMOST CERTAIN.

-- NEXT FALL'S UNGA SESSION

BOTH WE AND THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT AGREE THAT:

-- THE MOMENTUM OF THIS ISSUE AT UNGA RESTS WITH NORTH KOREA AND ITS SUPPORTERS, AND THEY WILL INTRODUCE ANOTHER HOSTILE RESOLUTION ON THE UNC AND OUR TROOP PRESENCE AT THE 30TH UNGA.

-- BARRING SOME ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR POLICY THERE IS A GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD PASS.

THE UN TACTICAL SITUATION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 065498

AT THE 30TH UNGA OUR TACTICAL OBJECTIVES WILL BE:
(A) TO DEFEAT A PRO-NORTH KOREAN DRAFT RESOLUTION, AND
(B) TO ADOPT A FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. AT BEST WE FACE AN UPHILL BATTLE ON BOTH.

WE SHOULD ASSUME A MAJOR NORTH KOREAN EFFORT TO REVERSE ITS NARROW DEFEAT AT LAST FALL'S UNGA, AND TO PRESS FOR PASSAGE OF A SIMILAR RESOLUTION CALLING FOR UNC TERMINATION AND REMOVAL OF U.S. FORCES. NORTH KOREA ALREADY IS CLAIMING THAT ITS DEFEAT LAST NOVEMBER WAS IN REALITY A MORAL VICTORY, WHICH IT WILL CONVERT INTO A SUBSTANTIVE VICTORY AT NEXT FALL'S UNGA. PYONGYANG PROBABLY WILL BANK ON PEKING-MOSCOW RIVALRY TO INSURE FAIRLY STRONG PRC AND AT LEAST MODERATE SOVIET SUPPORT. NORTH KOREA PROBABLY WILL ANTICIPATE GROWING THIRD WORLD SUPPORT FOR ITS POSITION ON THIS ISSUE, AND IT HAS STEPPED UP ITS DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE IN AFRICA.

FACTORS WHICH WILL COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS INCLUDE:

-- THE MOOD OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS LIKELY TO

BE MARKED BY A HEIGHTENED SENSE OF SOLIDARITY AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, SINCE IT WILL COME RIGHT ON THE HEELS OF THE 7TH SPECIAL SESSION ON ECONOMIC MATTERS. THE FACT THAT WE WILL PROBABLY FIND OURSELVES IN OPPOSITION TO KEY LDC ECONOMIC DEMANDS AT THE SPECIAL SESSION AND THE LIKELY RESENTMENT THIS MAY STIMULATE AGAINST US

VIEWS WILL PROBABLY LIMIT OUR CAPACITY TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT ON OTHER UNRELATED POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE UNGA, INCLUDING THE KOREAN QUESTION.

-- TO ACHIEVE BOTH OUR TACTICAL OBJECTIVES WE WILL NEED TO SUSTAIN THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF OUR FRIENDS, MANY OF WHOM ALREADY VIEW THE UN COMMAND AS AN ANACHRONISM. OUR CO-SPONSORS AND OTHER SUPPORTERS BELIEVE THAT WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DEFEAT THE CONTEMPLATED NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION UNLESS WE SHOW GOOD FAITH IN IMPLEMENTING OUR RESOLUTION OF LAST FALL'S UNGA -- EITHER THROUGH PROGRESS IN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON UNC TERMINATION, SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 065498

OR THROUGH UNILATERAL U.S. AND ROK MOVEMENT TO RESOLVE THE UNC QUESTION. EVEN WITH THE SUPPORT OF OUR TRADITIONAL ALLIES WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE ANOTHER ALL-OUT EFFORT TO PREVENT THE OPPOSITION FROM MOBILIZING A MAJORITY FOR ITS DRAFT RESOLUTION NEXT FALL.

III. POLICY OPTIONS

WE HAVE ESSENTIALLY 5 BROAD OPTIONS. THE RANGE OF OPTIONS ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. INDEED SOME SHOULD BE PACKAGED AND OUR GENERAL APPROACH SHOULD BE UNDER CONTINUING REVIEW AT EACH SUCCESSIVE STAGE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPTIONS POSITION.

OPTION 1: NO CHANGE IN OUR PRESENT POSITION ON
-- UNC TERMINATION

ADVANTAGES:

WE HAVE SET FORTH A REASONABLE CONDITION FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE UNC. WE COULD JUST SIT TIGHT AND HOPE THROUGH PERSUASION AND ARM TWISTING TO PREVAIL ONCE AGAIN THIS YEAR, AT A POLITICAL PRICE. GLOOMY PROGNOSTICATIONS ON OUR VOTING PROSPECTS HAVE BEEN WRONG BEFORE. WE COULD LIVE WITH THE PASSAGE OF A HOSTILE RESOLUTION OR ALTERNATIVELY THE PASSAGE OF OUR OWN AND A HOSTILE RESOLUTION. THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME WOULD BE A "CONSENSUS" RESOLUTION SOMEWHAT WEIGHTED AGAINST US. HOWEVER THE ROK WOULD REGARD EITHER OUTCOME AS A SEVERE POLITICAL DEFEAT. SINCE THE UNC WAS CREATED BY SC RESOLU-

TION, GA RESOLUTIONS WOULD MERELY BE AN EXPRESSION OF UNGA VIEWS WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT.

DISADVANTAGES:

THIS OPTION ENSURES THAT THE INITIATIVE WILL REST WITH THE SUPPORTERS OF THE DPRK. WE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO HOLD OUR SUPPORTERS WITHOUT SOME GESTURE OR EVIDENCE OF MOVEMENT. EVEN IF IT IS OF NO LEGAL EFFECT, PASSAGE OF A HOSTILE UN RESOLUTION WOULD CHALLENGE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE UNC, BLUR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE UNC AND THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES, DIMINISH OUR POLITICAL SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 065498

POSITION AND THAT OF THE ROKG, AND POSSIBLY INCREASE PUBLIC RESENTMENT IN THE U.S. TOWARD THE UN. THE PROSPECT OF ANOTHER DEBATE WOULD ALSO STIMULATE THIRD PARTIES TO UNDERTAKE UNHELPFUL INITIATIVES.

OPTION 2: UNILATERALLY DISSOLVE THE UNC

IN ORDER TO AVOID A UNGA DEBATE, CINCUNC COULD DECLARE THE COMMANDERS OF THE U.S. FORCES IN KOREA AND SOUTH KOREA'S ARMED FORCES AS "SUCCESSORS IN COMMAND" TO CINCUNC. THE USG AND THE ROKG COULD ANNOUNCE OUR JOINT INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO HONOR THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, AND INDICATE OUR EXPECTATION THAT OTHER PARTIES TO THE ARMISTICE WILL LIKEWISE UPHOLD THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THAT AGREEMENT.

ADVANTAGES:

BY DISSOLVING THE UNC, WE WOULD STRENGTHEN ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANY UNGA DEBATE (BUT WOULD NO DOUBT FACE ONE AT THE 30TH GA ANYWAY) AND, IF A DEBATE WERE HELD, MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO LINK BETWEEN THE UN'S INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA AND THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF OUR FORCES. WE WOULD THEREBY GAIN THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN THE UNGA ACROSS THE BROAD SPECTRUM FOR OUR POSITION THAT THE US FORCE PRESENCE IS SOLELY A BILATERAL US-ROK MATTER.

DISADVANTAGES:

WHETHER THE UNC EXISTS OR NOT, NORTH KOREA WOULD PROBABLY PRESS FOR DEBATE ON THE U.S. FORCE PRESENCE. THIS COURSE OF ACTION WOULD ALSO REQUIRE A GAMBLE THAT THE PRC/DPRK STAKE IN STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA WOULD INHIBIT THEM FROM USING THIS MOVE AS A PRETEXT, NOW OR IN THE FUTURE, FOR RENOUNCING THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE ARMISTICE. SINCE NEITHER THE ROK NOR THE US MILITARY

REPRESENTATIVE IS A SIGNATORY TO THE ARMISTICE (WHICH WAS SIGNED ONLY BY CINCUNC), THE NORTH KOREANS COULD CLAIM THAT IT HAS LAPSED WITH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNC.

OF SPECIAL CONCERN IN THIS CONNECTION IS THE NORTH-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 065498

WEST ISLANDS QUESTION. THE ARMISTICE CLEARLY STIPULATES THAT THE ISLANDS ARE UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE UNC. (THEY ARE IN FACT UNDER ROK CONTROL). IF THE VALIDITY OF THE ARMISTICE WERE CALLED INTO QUESTION, HOWEVER, THE DPRK MIGHT ATTEMPT TO ADVANCE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND POSSIBLY MAKE MILITARY MOVES TO BUTTRESS THEM, GIVEN THE PROXIMITY OF THE ISLANDS TO NORTH KOREA.

OPTION 3: NEW NEGOTIATING INITIATIVE THROUGH
-- THE CHINESE

WE HAVE NOT YET TAKEN THE INITIATIVE TO PICK UP THE THREAD OF OUR DISCUSSIONS ON THE UNC OR THE KOREAN QUESTION SINCE THE OCTOBER DINNER DISCUSSION WITH THE PRC. WE COULD APPROACH THE CHINESE AGAIN TO CONFIRM OUR WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ALONG THE LINES OUTLINED TO THEM LAST YEAR, I.E., UNC TERMINATION LINKED TO MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

WE WOULD HAVE TO WEIGH CAREFULLY PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE IN THE LIGHT OF OUR BASIC BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S FALL VISIT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST BE IN A POSITION TO ASSURE OUR ALLIES CONFIDENTIALLY THAT WE HAVE IN FACT BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE PRC. THIS IS PROBABLY A MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR SUPPORT.

ADVANTAGES:

IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THE CHINESE RESPONSE IS POSITIVE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW UP QUICKLY. IF IT IS NOT, WE WILL HAVE LOST NOTHING, WE WILL HAVE PLAYED STRAIGHT WITH THE PRC, AND WILL -- FOR THE BENEFIT OF OUR SUPPORTERS IN THE UNGA -- HAVE DEMONSTRATED AGAIN OUR DETERMINATION TO EXHAUST ALL POSSIBLE MEANS OF SECURING A NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

DISADVANTAGES:

THE ONLY DISADVANTAGE TO THIS APPROACH TO THE PRC
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 065498

IS THE PROBABILITY THAT THEIR RESPONSE TO SUCH A PROPOSAL WILL BE NO MORE FORTHCOMING THAN IN THE PAST. HOWEVER, AS NOTED ABOVE, OUR RECORD WILL BE CLEAR.

OPTION 3A - A VARIANT - DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH
-- PYONGYANG

ADVANTAGES:

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH WOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH PYONGYANG. ULTIMATELY THE CONCESSION THAT MIGHT EVINCE NORTH KOREAN FLEXIBILITY ON THE UNC ISSUE WILL BE OUR READINESS TO ESTABLISH SOME OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE NORTH.

DISADVANTAGES:

WHEREAS DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NORTH HAVE UTILITY FOR US INsofar AS WE CAN USE THEM TO SUSTAIN THE ARMISTICE AND STABILIZE CONDITIONS ON THE PENINSULA, THE NORTH IS STILL INTERESTED IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS PRIMARILY IN ORDER TO HASTEN OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PENINSULA, STIMULATE FRICTIONS IN US/ROK RELATIONS, AND COMPOUND THE POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES AND DIVISIONS IN THE SOUTH. THE INITIATION OF CONTACTS WITH THE NORTH WOULD ENHANCE THEIR PRESTIGE AND HAVE A SERIOUS IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ROKG. TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS WITH THE NORTH WITHOUT EXPLICIT APPROVAL BY THE ROKG WOULD CAUSE GRAVE MISTRUST IN SEOUL AND PLAY DIRECTLY INTO THE NORTH'S HANDS. WITHOUT CHINESE AND/OR RUSSIAN WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH CONTACTS WITH SEOUL, ROKG APPROVAL OF DIRECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND PYONGYANG IS NOT IN THE CARDS.

OPTION 4: STUDY POSSIBLE UNC REORGANIZATION AND
-- LOWERING OF UNC PROFILE

WE BELIEVE WE WOULD BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH A HOLDING POSITION IN NEW YORK BY A LIMITED UNC REORGANIZATION AND A LOWERING OF ITS PROFILE. THIS COULD INVOLVE STRIPPING THE UN COMMAND OF ALL FUNCTIONS EXCEPT THOSE DIRECTLY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 065498

RELATED TO ADMINISTERING THE ARMISTICE.

WE ARE STUDYING A VERY LIMITED MOVE UNDER WHICH THE

UNC FUNCTION WOULD BE NARROWLY DEFINED AS ONLY ADMINISTERING THE ARMISTICE. THE UN COMMANDER WOULD RETAIN HIS TITLE BUT THE "UN COMMAND" WOULD CONSIST ONLY OF THOSE ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT HEADQUARTERS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD BE A VERY SMALL NUMBER INCLUDING THE ARMISTICE OFFAIRS DIVISION AND OUR SENIOR MEMBER OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMAND. OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING QUESTIONS

RELATING TO OPERATIONAL CONTROL, COORDINATION AND PLANS, NOW UNDERTAKEN BY THE UN COMMAND WOULD BE HANDLED THROUGH DIRECT BILATERAL MILITARY COMMAND RELATIONSHIP, POSSIBLY BY FORMATION OF SOME COMBINED HEADQUARTERS OR MILITARY COORDINATION ENTITY. THIS WOULD INVOLVE NO CHANGE IN OUR FORCE LEVELS OR UNIT DEPLOYMENTS AND, IN FACT, COULD ENTAIL VERY MINIMAL CHANGES IN THE UNC/COMUSK HEADQUARTERS. IT WOULD INVOLVE NO CHANGE IN OUR BASIC SECURITY COMMITMENT TO THE ROK.

A BY-PRODUCT OF A DECISION TO LIMIT THE UNC FUNCTION WOULD BE TO CONSIDER AGAIN THE QUESTION OF US OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER SOUTH KOREAN FORCES. WE WOULD ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL, IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERAGENCY DELIBERATIONS ON COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. (NSDM 251 ADDRESSED THIS QUESTION AND INITIAL CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ROKG TOOK PLACE LAST YEAR.)

ADVANTAGES:

THIS WOULD REMOVE ANY IMPLICATION OF A LINK BETWEEN THE UN'S INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA AND THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN THE PENINSULA. IT WOULD REINFORCE FOR UN MEMBERS THE LOGICAL PREMISE UNDERLYING OUR POLICY, I.E., THE NEED TO ASSURE CONTINUITY IN THE ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS IN RETURN FOR UNC DISSOLUTION.

SUCH AN INTIATIVE AS THIS WOULD GIVE US A
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 065498

SOMEWHAT STRONGER POSITION IN NEW YORK AT NO COST TO OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION. IN ADDITION THE UNC RESTRUCTURING SHOULD NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MISREADING BY THE DPRK. IT WOULD INVOLVE NO ESSENTIAL CHANGES IN OUR MILITARY POSITION WHILE OBVIOUSLY PROVIDING US WITH AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER TO THEIR PROPAGANDA CRITICISMS.

DISADVANTAGES:

WHILE THIS OPTION WOULD STILL PRESERVE OUR SIDE'S

SIGNATOR OF THE ARMISTICE, WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE NORTH KOREANS MIGHT SEIZE ON ANY VISIBLE RESTRUCTURING TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE ARMISTICE. AS A LEGAL MATTER, THE NORTH KOREANS COULD ALLEGE THAT UNLIKE THE NORTH SIDE, NO FORCES IN THE SOUTH NOR THE NORTHWEST ISLANDS ARE UNDER THE COMMAND OR CON-

DUCT OF AN ARMISTICE SIGNATORY; THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF FORCES UNDER HIS CONTROL, CINCUNC IS NO LONGER IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUT HIS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER ARTICLE 17 OF THE ARMISTICE REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARMISTICE, AND THEREFORE THAT THE LACK OF MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS RELEASED THE NORTH SIDE FROM ITS ARMISTICE OBLIGATION.

HOWEVER, SUCH A NORTH KOREAN ARGUMENT WOULD BE MUCH MORE SUBTLE THAN WOULD BE THE CASE IF WE UNILATERALLY TERMINATED THE UNC. WE BELIEVE SUCH AN ACTION WOULD CLEARLY INDICATE A DELIBERATE POLICY DECISION BY THE NORTH TO JUNK THE ARMISTICE AND WOULD BE SO INTERPRETED INTERNATIONALLY WITH THE ONUS CLEARLY FALLING ON PYONGYANG. FURTHERMORE, THE HAZARDS TO OUR LEGAL POSITION MAY BE REDUCABLE BY CAREFUL FORMULATION OF THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THE UNC AND ROC CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS OPTION, WITH A VIEW TOWARD MINIMIZING APPEARANCES THAT CINCUNC'S ABILITY TO INSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE ARMISTICE HAD BEEN AFFECTED.

OPTION 5: CONSIDERATION OF THE KOREAN QUESTION

-- IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 12 STATE 065498

OPTION 5A: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

THE ROKG HAS GIVEN US A POSITION PAPER SUGGESTING A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON KOREA IN THE SUMMER. IN ESSENCE THE ROKG WOULD PROPOSE THAT WE PUBLICLY STATE IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS OUR READINESS TO DISSOLVE THE UNC, LINKING THE TIMING OF DISSOLUTION TO ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED, FOR A UNC SUCCESSOR TO ASSURE CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THE ROKG PROPOSES THAT WE PUBLICLY DECLARE OUR READINESS TO ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE ON THIS MATTER AT ANY TIME. THE ROKG ALSO WISHES US TO RAISE AGAIN THE QUESTION OF ROK ADMISSION TO THE UN AT A SECURITY COUNCIL SESSION. SEVERAL OF THE PAST CO-SPONSORS OF OUR KOREAN RESOLUTIONS HAVE ALSO ENCOURAGED THE IDEA

OF AN EARLY SECURITY COUNCIL SESSION ON KOREA AT WHICH WE WOULD ANNOUNCE SOME UNDEFINED BUT CONCRETE "UNILATERAL" CONCESSION ON THE UNC.

ADVANTAGES:

THIS WOULD HIGHLIGHT THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE OTHER SIDE, AND WOULD BE A HIGHLY VISIBLE FORUM TO

REEMPHASIZE OUR READINESS TO END THE UNC SUBJECT ONLY TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IT MIGHT ALSO ALLOW US TO ARGUE THAT SINCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS ALREADY ADDRESSING THE KOREAN PROBLEM, THE UNGA SHOULD NOT CONSIDER THE QUESTION.

DISADVANTAGES:

WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO AN EARLY SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON KOREA AND BELIEVE THAT THE DISADVANTAGES OUTWEIGH THE ADVANTAGES.

WE ESTIMATE ANY PRO-US RESOLUTION WOULD RECEIVE FIVE OR SIX POSITIVE VOTES IN THE COUNCIL (WITH FRANCE A VARIABLE), FIVE OR SIX NEGATIVE VOTES, AND FOUR OR
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 13 STATE 065498

FIVE ABSTENTIONS. MUCH THE SAME LINEUP WOULD GREET ANY PRO-NORTH KOREAN PROPOSALS. NEITHER SIDE COULD MANEUVER THE OTHER INTO A "VETO" SITUATION. GIVEN PRC VIEWS, WE COULD NOT COUNT ON THE NECESSARY NINE VOTES TO INSCRIBE A KOREAN ITEM ON THE SC AGENDA. WE WOULD NEED FOUR POSITIVE VOTES FROM AMONG SWEDEN, FRANCE, CAMEROON, GUYANA, AND TANZANIA -- A HIGHLY UNLIKELY PROSPECT.

AT THIS POINT IN TIME, SURFACING THE KOREAN ISSUE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD CLEARLY LEAD TO HIGHLY NEGATIVE REACTIONS BY BOTH THE PRC AND USSR AND THUS STIMULATE POSTURING AND RIGID POSITIONS GIVEN THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THIS ISSUE. THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE WILL FAVORABLY INFLUENCE A SUBSEQUENT UNGA DEBATE. IN FACT WE MIGHT FIND OURSELVES IN A POSITION WHERE WE HAVE STERILE ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE GOING ON IN TWO UN FORUMS INSTEAD OF ONE.

OPTION 5B: USE THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONTEXT FOR
-- ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHANGES IN THE CHARACTER
-- AND ROLE OF THE UNC AND OF US/ROK WILL-
-- INGNESS TO MEET WITH THE OTHER PARTIES
-- DIRECTLY CONCERNED.

RATHER THAN MOVING TO A FORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IT IS POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE OUR TACTICAL POSITION BY USING THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONTEXT FOR A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANY CHANGES WE MIGHT MAKE IN LOWERING THE UNC PROFILE ALONG THE LINES OF OPTION 4.

-SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT COULD ALSO INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO TERMINATE THE UNC'S RESIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES (I.E., THE ARMISTICE-MONITORING ELEMENT), SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF PRESERVING THE ARMISTICE. WE WOULD ALSO PUBLICLY AFFIRM OUR READINESS TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED (ROK, PRC, DPRK) AT AN EARLY DATE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER IN PANMUNJOM, NEW YORK, OR ANY OTHER MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SITE. THE ROK WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY INDICATE ITS ADHERENCE TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 14 STATE 065498

ITS WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A MEETING.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT COULD BE MADE IN A LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. PRESUMABLY THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD CIRCULATE THE LETTER AS A UN OR SC DOCUMENT BUT COUNCIL ACTION WOULD NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CONSULT WITH COUNCIL MEMBERS BEFORE ANY EFFORTS TO RAISE THE MATTER IN THE COUNCIL WERE UNDERTAKEN. WE WOULD EXPECT THE CHINESE TO OPPOSE SUCH EFFORTS BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, WE WOULD GET OUR POSITION CLEARLY ON THE RECORD.

ADVANTAGES:

THE LETTER WOULD PUT FORWARD OUR NEGOTIATING PROPOSITION IN A FORWARD-LOOKING WAY, MAKING NO REFERENCE TO THE DISCUSSIONS WE CONDUCTED WITH THE CHINESE LAST FALL. IT COULD SERVE TO INFORM THE MEMBERS OF THE UN PUBLICLY OF OUR INTENT TO GIVE EFFECT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3333 OF DECEMBER 17, 1974 ON KOREA. A LETTER WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO AVOID A UNGA DEBATE. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, GIVE US A BETTER DEFENSIVE POSITION FROM WHICH TO AWAIT SIGNS OF NORTH KOREAN FLEXIBILITY. UNC RESTRUCTURING, IF FEASIBLE, WOULD CREATE AT LEAST THE APPEARANCE OF MOVEMENT ON OUR PART AND GIVE US A STRONG ARGUING POINT IN URGING OUR UN SUPPORTERS TO MAINTAIN THEIR STANCE IN FAVOR OF OUR BASIC POSITION.

DISADVANTAGES:

IT MAY BE THAT THE TIDE IN NEW YORK OPPOSING CONTINUED UN INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH KOREA WILL BE TOO STRONG TO BE STOPPED BY OUR LIMITED MOVE.

IV. PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION

WE BELIEVE OUR POLICY APPROACH SHOULD BE TO LINK

AT LEAST ONE MORE APPROACH TO THE CHINESE WITH PREPARA-
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PAGE 15 STATE 065498

TIONS TO IMPROVE OUR TACTICAL POSITION IN NEW YORK ALONG THE LINES OF OPTION 5B ABOVE. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT WE WOULD, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE ROKG, MOVE TO:

(A) PREPARE FOR AN EARLY APPROACH TO THE PRC TO PROPOSE RESUMPTION OF OUR DIALOGUE ON UNC TERMINATION.

IN IT WE WOULD, IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR PRESENT POLICY, REITERATE OUR READINESS TO TERMINATE THE UNC UPON EXPLICIT ASSURANCE FROM THE OTHER SIDE THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WOULD BE MAINTAINED; AND

(B) IF OUR APPROACH TO THE PRC DID NOT RESULT IN MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS. WE WOULD MOVE TO LOWER THE UNC PROFILE, IF FEASIBLE BY REDUCING THE UNC FUNCTIONS TO THOSE DIRECTLY RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. WE WOULD BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH DEFENSE IMMEDIATELY ON THIS AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF ANY SUCCESSOR MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS, AND BE PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT THIS OPTION IN THE EVENT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT RESULT. OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO BE IN A POSITION TO SUBMIT A LETTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL -- IN THE JUNE-JULY TIMEFRAME.

WE EXPECT THE ROKG REACTION TO THIS APPROACH WILL BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND GENERALLY POSITIVE. THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE UNGA SITUATION IS SIMILAR TO OURS AND OUR PROPOSAL REFLECTS IN PART VIEWS INFORMALLY EXPRESSED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THE STICKING POINT WILL BE ROK INTEREST IN A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. KIM DONG-JO WILL BE HERE MARCH 26-28 AND WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SHARE VIEWS ON OUR APPROACH AND SECURE HIS INITIAL REACTIONS.

THIS PROPOSED APPROACH WOULD:

-- TEST NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS, AND ALSO RELATIVE PRC INFLUENCE WITH PYONGYANG ON THIS QUESTION.

-- DEMONSTRATE CONTINUED U.S. SUPPORT FOR SOUTH
KOREA'S SECURITY AND DIPLOMATIC POSITION.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 16 STATE 065498

-- SHOW U.S. WILLINGNESS TO BE FLEXIBLE ON
MODALITIES AS LONG AS THE BASIC STABILITY OF THE
KOREAN PENINSULA IS PRESERVED.

-- HOPEFULLY MAXIMIZE OUR CHANCES OF DEFEATING
THE ANTICIPATED NORTH KOREAN RESOLUTION IN NEXT FALL'S

UNGA, SHORT OF IMMEDIATE UNILATERAL TERMINATION OF
THE UNC.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ABOVE
APPROACH MAY WELL SECURE US ONLY A TEMPORARY TACTICAL
ADVANTAGE IN THE UN. DEPENDING ON THE TREND OF EVENTS
IN NEW YORK, EITHER THIS YEAR OR NEXT YEAR, WE MAY
WELL HAVE TO FACE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE CAN LONG
MAINTAIN THE UNC IN ANY FORM. HOWEVER, THE APPROACH
OUTLINED ABOVE DOES NOT, BY ITSELF, FORECLOSE FURTHER
INITIATIVES ON OUR PART, AND IN FACT COULD, PARTICULAR-
LY WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBLE UNC RESTRUCTURING, PRO-
VIDE A LOWER VISIBILITY TRANSITION STRUCTURE IF WE ARE
COMPELLED TO CONSIDER SOME FURTHER FUTURE CHANGES IN
THE UNC.

V. RECOMMENDATION

-- THAT YOU APPROVE THE APPROACH WE HAVE RECOM-
MENDED ABOVE TO PREPARE FOR A LIKELY UNGA DEBATE OF
THE KOREAN QUESTION NEXT FALL.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

NOTE: ABOVE PAPER CLEARED WITH NSC STAFF (SMYSER,
SOLOMON AND FROEBE).

INGERSOLL

SECRET

NNN

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